Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics
Most current economic models assume that people pursue only their own material self-interest and do not care about "social" goals. One exception to self-interest which has received some attention by economists is simple altruism: people may care not only about their own well-being, but also about the well-being of others. Yet psychological evidence indicates that most altruistic behavior is more complex: people do not seek uniformly to help other people; rather, they do so according to how generous these other people are being. Indeed, the same people who are altrustic to other altruistic people are also motivated to hurt those who hurt them. If somebody is being nice to you, fairness dictates that you be nice to him. If somebody is being mean to you, fairness allows-and vindictiveness dictates-that you be mean to him.
Clearly, these emotions have economic implications. If an employee has been exceptionally loyal, then a manger may feel some obligation to treat that employee well, even when it is not in his self-interest to do so. Other examples of economic behavior induced by social goals are voluntary reductions of water-use during droughts, conservation of energy to help solve the energy crisis (as documented, for instance, in Kenneth E. Train et al. [1987] ), donations to public television stations, and many forms of voluntary labor. (Burton A. Weisbrod [1988] estimates that, in the United States, the total value of voluntary labor is $74 billion annually.)
On the negative side, a consumer may not buy a product sold by a monopolist at an "unfair" price, even if the material value to the consumer is greater than the price. By not buying, the consumer lowers his own material well-being so as to punish the monopolist. An employee who feels she has been mistreated by a firm may engage in acts of sabotage. Members of a striking labor union may strike longer than is in their material interests because they want to punish a firm for being unfair.
By modeling such emotions formally, one can begin to understand their economic and welfare implications more rigorously and more generally. In this paper, I develop a game-theoretic framework for incorporating such emotions into a broad range of economic models.1 My framework incorporates the following three stylized facts: In the next section, I briefly present some of the evidence from the psychological literature regarding these stylized facts. In Section II, I develop a game-theoretic solution concept "fairness equilibrium" that incorporates these stylized facts. Fairness equilibria do not in general constitute either a subset or a superset of Nash equilibria; that is, incorporating fairness considerations can both add new predictions to economic models and eliminate conventional predictions. In Section III, I present some general results about which outcomes in economic situations are likely to be fairness equilibria. The results demonstrate the special role of "mutual-max" outcomes (in which, given the other person's behavior, each person maximizes the other's material payoffs) and "mutual-min" outcomes (in which, given the other person's behavior, each person minimizes the other's material payoffs). The following results hold: (i) Any Nash equilibrium that is either a mutual-max outcome or mutual-min outcome is also a fairness equilibrium. I hope this framework will eventually be used to study the implications of fairness in different economic situations. While I do not develop extended applications in this paper, Section IV contains examples illustrating the economic implications of my model of fairness. I develop a simple model of monopoly pricing and show that fairness implies that goods can only be sold at below the classical monopoly price. I then explore the implications of fairness in an extended labor example.
I consider some welfare implications of my model in Section V. Many researchers in welfare economics have long considered issues of fairness to be important in evaluating the desirability of different economic outcomes. Yet while such policy analysis incorporates economists' judgments of fairness and equity, it often ignores the concerns for fairness and equity of the economic actors being studied. By considering how people's attitudes toward fairness influence their behavior and well-being, my framework can help incorporate such concerns more directly into policy analysis and welfare economics.
While my model suggests that the behavioral implications of fairness are greatest when the material consequences of an economic interaction are not too large, there are several reasons why this does not imply that the economic implications of fairness are minor. First, while it is true that fairness influences behavior most when material stakes are small, it is not clear that it makes little difference when material stakes are large. Little empirical research on the economic implications of fairness has been conducted, and much anecdotal evidence suggests that people sacrifice substantial amounts of money to reward or punish kind or unkind behavior. Second, many major economic institutions, most notably decentralized markets, are best described as accumulations of minor economic interactions, so that the aggregate implications of departures from standard theory in these cases may be substantial. Third, the fairness component of a person's overall well-being can be influenced substantially by even small material changes.
Finally, even if material incentives in a situation are so large as to dominate behavior, fairness still matters. Welfare economics should be concerned not only with the efficient allocation of material goods, but also with designing institutions such that people are happy about the way they interact with others. For instance, if a person leaves an exchange in which he was treated unkindly, then his unhappiness at being so treated should be a consideration in evaluating the efficiency of that exchange. Armed with well-founded psychological assumptions, economists can start to address the nonmaterial benefits and costs of the free market and other institutions.2 I conclude the paper in Section VI with a discussion of some of the shortfalls of my model and an outline of possible extensions.
I. Fairness in Games: Some Evidence
In this section, I discuss some psychological research that demonstrates the stylized facts outlined in the Introduction. Consider fact A: "People are willing to sacrifice their own material well-being to help those who are being kind." The attempt to provide public goods without coercion is an archetypical example in which departures from pure self-interest can be beneficial to society, and it has been studied by psychologists as a means of testing for the existence of altruism and cooperation. 1988a, b) . These experiments typically involve subjects choosing how much to contribute toward a public good, where the self-interested contribution is small or zero. The evidence from these experiments is that people cooperate to a degree greater than would be implied by pure self-interest. Many of these experiments are surveyed in Robyn M. Dawes and Richard H. Thaler (1988) , who conclude that, for most experiments of one-shot public-good decisions in which the individually optimal contribution is close to 0 percent, the contribution rate ranges between 40 percent and 60 percent of the socially optimal level.3
These experiments indicate that contributions toward public goods are not, however, the result of "pure altruism," where people seek unconditionally to help others. Rather, the willingness to help seems highly contingent on the behavior of others. If people do not think that others are doing their fair share, then their enthusiasm for sacrificing for others is greatly diminished. 2Indeed, I show in Section V that there exist situations in which the unique fairness equilibrium leaves both players feeling that they have been treated unkindly. This means that negative emotions may be endogenously generated by particular economic structures. I also state and prove an unhappy theorem: every game contains at least one such "unkind equilibrium." That is, there does not exist any situation in which players necessarily depart with positive feelings. Indeed, stylized fact B says that people will in some situations not only refuse to help others, but will sacrifice to hurt others who are being unfair. This idea has been most widely explored in the "ultimatum game," discussed at length in Thaler (1988) . The ultimatum game consists of two people splitting some fixed amount of money X according to the following rules: a "proposer" offers some division of X to a "decider." If the decider says yes, they split the money according to the proposal. If the decider says no, they both get no money. The result of pure self-interest is clear: proposers will never offer more than a penny, and deciders should accept any offer of at least a penny. Yet experiments clearly reject such behavior. Data show that, even in oneshot settings, deciders are willing to punish unfair offers by rejecting them, and proposers tend to make fair offers. Stylized fact C says that people will not be as willing to sacrifice a great amount of money to maintain fairness as they would be with small amounts of money. It is tested and partially confirmed in Gerald Leventhal and David Anderson (1970), but its validity is intuitive to most people. If the ultimatum game were conducted with $1, then most deciders would reject a proposed split of ($0.90, $0.10). If the ultimatum game were conducted with $10 million, the vast majority of deciders would accept a proposed split of ($9 million, $1 million).5 Consider also the following example from Dawes and Thaler (1988 p. 145):
In the rural areas around Ithaca it is common for farmers to put some fresh produce on a table by the road. There is a cash box on the table, and customers are expected to put money in the box in return for the vegetables they take. The box has just a small slit, so money can only be put in, not taken out. Also, the box is attached to the table, so no one can (easily) make off with the money. We think that the farmers who use this system have just about the right model of human nature. They feel that enough people will volunteer to pay for the fresh corn to make it worthwhile to put it out there. The farmers also know that if it were easy enough to take the money, someone would do so.
This example is in the spirit of stylized fact C: people succumb to the temptation to pursue their interests at the expense of others in proportion to the profitability of doing so.
From an economist's point of view, it matters not only whether stylized facts A-C are true, but whether they have important economic implications. Kahneman To motivate both the general framework and my specific model, consider Example 1 (see Fig. 1 ), where X is a positive number. (Throughout the paper, I shall represent games with the positive "scale variable" X. This allows me to consider the effects of increasing or decreasing a game's stakes without changing its fundamental strategic structure.) This is a standard battle-of-thesexes game: two people prefer to go to the same event together, but each prefers a different event. Formally, both players prefer to play either (opera, opera) or (boxing, boxing) rather than not coordinating; but player 1 prefers (opera, opera), and player 2 prefers (boxing, boxing).
The payoffs are a function only of the moves made by the players. Suppose, however, that player 1 (say) cares not only about his own payoff, but depending on player 2's motives, he cares also about player 2's payoff. In particular, if player 2 seems to be intentionally helping player 1, then player 1 will be motivated to help player 2; if player 2 seems to be intentionally hurting player 1, then player 1 will wish to hurt player 2.
Suppose player 1 believes (a) that player 2 is playing boxing, and (b) that player 2 believes player 1 is playing boxing. Then player 1 concludes that player 2 is choosing an action that helps both players (playing opera would hurt both players). Because player 2 is not being either generous or mean, neither stylized fact A nor B applies. Thus, player 1 will be neutral about his effect on player 2 and will pursue his material self-interest by playing boxing. If this argument is repeated for player 2, one can show that, in the natural sense, (boxing, boxing) is an equilibrium: if it is common knowledge that this will be the outcome, then each player is maximizing his utility by playing his strategy.
Of course, (boxing, boxing) is a conventional Nash equilibrium in this game. To see the importance of fairness, suppose player 1 believes (a) that player 2 will play boxing, and (b) that player 2 believes that player 1 is playing opera. Now player 1 concludes that player 2 is lowering her own payoff in order to hurt him. Player 1 will therefore feel hostility toward player 2 and will wish to harm her. If this hostility is strong enough, player 1 may be willing to sacrifice his own material well-being, and play opera rather than boxing. Indeed, if both players have a strong enough emotional reaction to each other's behavior, then (opera, boxing) is an equilibrium. If it is common knowledge that they are playing this outcome, then, in the induced atmosphere of hostility, both players will wish to stick with it.
Notice the central role of expectations: player l's payoffs do not depend simply on the actions taken, but also on his beliefs about player 2's motives. Could these emotions be directly modeled by transforming the payoffs, so that one could analyze this transformed game in the conventional way? This turns out to be impossible. In the natural sense, both of the equilibria discussed above are strict: each player strictly prefers to play his strategy given the equilibrium. In the equilibrium (boxing, boxing), player 1 strictly prefers playing boxing to opera. In the equilibrium (opera, boxing) player 1 strictly prefers opera to boxing. No matter what payoffs are chosen, these statements would be contradictory if payoffs depended solely on the actions taken. To formalize these preferences, therefore, it is necessary to develop a model that explicitly incorporates beli-efs.7 I now construct such a model, applicable to all two-person, finite-strategy games.
Consider a two-player, normal form game with (mixed) strategy sets S1 and S2 for players 1 and 2, derived from finite purestrategy sets A1 and A2. Let vi: SI x S2 -lbe player i's material payoffs.8
From this "material game," I now construct a "psychological game" as defined in GPS. I assume that each player's subjective expected utility when he chooses his strategy will depend on three factors: (i) his strategy, ( 7My point here is that the results I get could not be gotten simply by respecifying the payoffs over the physical actions in the game. Van Kolpin (1993) argues that one can apply conventional game theory to these games by including the choice of beliefs as additional parts of plavers' strategies.
I shall emphasize pure strategies in this paper, though formal definitions allow for mixed strategies, and all stated results apply to them. One reason I de-emphasize mixed strategies is that the characterization of preferences over mixed strategies is not straightforward. In psychological games, there can be a difference between interpreting mixed strategies literally as purposeful mixing by a player versus interpreting them as uncertainty by other players. Such issues of interpretation are less important in conventional game theory, and consequently incorporating mixed strategies is more straightforward. These kindness functions can now be used to specify fully the players' preferences. Each player i chooses ai to maximize his expected utility Ui(ai, bj, ci), which incorporates both his material utility and the players' shared notion of fairness:
Ui(ai bj, ci) = ri(ai, bj) + fj(bj, ci) [1 + fi(ai, bj)] .
The central behavioral feature of these preferences reflects the original discussion.
If player i believes that player j is treating him badly-fj() < 0-then player i wishes to treat player j badly, by choosing an action ai such that fif() is low or negative. If player j is treating player i kindly, then fj( ) will be positive, and player i will wish to treat player j kindly. Of course, the specified utility function is such that players will trade off their preference for fairness against their material well-being, and material pursuits may override concerns for fairness.
Because the kindness functions are bounded above and below, this utility function reflects stylized fact C: the bigger the material payoffs, the less the players' behavior reflects their concern for fairness. Thus, the behavior in these games is sensitive to the scale of material payoffs. Obviously, I have not precisely determined the relative power of fairness versus material interest or even given units for the material payoffs; my results in specific examples are, therefore, only qualitative.
Notice that the preferences Vi(ai, bj, ci) rri(ai, bj) + fj(bj, ci) . fi(ai, bj) would yield precisely the same behavior as the utility function Ui(ai, bj, ci). I have made the preferences slightly more complicated so as to capture one bit of realism: whenever player j is treating player i unkindly, player i's overall utility will be lower than his material payoffs. That is, fj() < 0 implies Ui() < 7ri ). If a person is treated badly, he leaves the situation bitter, and his ability to take revenge only partly makes up for the loss in welfare. 1 Because these preferences form a psychological game, I can use the concept of psychological Nash equilibrium defined by GPS; this is simply the analog of Nash equilibrium for psychological games, imposing the additional condition that all higher-order 9When 7h = min, all of player i's responses to b yield player j the same payoff. Therefore, there is no issue of kindness, and fi = 0. '0As Lones Smith has pointed out to me, however, this specification has one unrealistic implication: if player 1 is being "mean" to player 2 (f1 < 0), then the nicer player 2 is to player 1, the happier is player 1, even if one ignores the implication for material payoffs. While this is perhaps correct if people enjoy making suckers of others, it is more likely that a player will feel guilty if he is mean to somebody who is nice to him. beliefs match actual behavior. I shall call the solution concept thus defined "fairness equilibrium." 11 Definition 3: The pair of strategies (aj,a2) E (S1, S2) is a fairness equilibrium if, for i=1,2, j*i,
ai E argmaxaEsiUi;(a,bj,ci) (2) ci=bi=ai.
Is this solution concept consistent with the earlier discussion of Example 1? In particular, is the "hostile" outcome (opera, boxing) a fairness equilibrium? If c1 = b1 = a1 = opera and c2 = b2 = a2 = boxing, then player 2 feels hostility, and f2 = -1. Thus, player l's utility from playing U is 0 (with fl = -1) and from playing boxing it is X -1 (with f1 = 0). Thus, if X < 1, player 1 prefers opera to boxing given these beliefs. Player 2 prefers boxing to opera. For X < 1, therefore, (opera, boxing) is an equilibrium. In this equilibrium, both players are hostile toward each other and unwilling to coordinate with the other if it means conceding to the other player.12
Because the players will feel no hostility if they coordinate, both (opera, opera) and (boxing, boxing) are also equilibria for all values of X. Again, these are conventional outcomes; the interesting implication of . 2 ). Consider the cooperative outcome, (cooperate, cooperate). If it is common knowledge to the players that they are playing (cooperate, cooperate), then each player knows that the other is sacrificing his own material well-being in order to help him. Each will thus want to help the other by playing cooperate, so long as the material gains from defecting are not too large. Thus, if X is small enough (less than -), (cooperate, cooperate) is a fairness equilibrium.
For any value of X, however, the Nash equilibrium (defect, defect) is also a fairness equilibrium. This is because if it is common knowledge that they are playing (defect, defect), then each player knows that the other is not willing to sacrifice X in order to give the other 6X. Thus, both players will be hostile; in the outcome (defect, defect), each player is satisfying both his desire to hurt the other and his material self-interest. The prisoner's dilemma illustrates two issues I discussed earlier. First, one cannot fully capture realistic behavior by invoking "pure altruism." In Example 2, both (cooperate, cooperate) and (defect, defect) are fairness equilibria, and I believe this prediction of the model is in line with reality. People sometimes cooperate, but if each expects the other player to defect, then they both will. Yet, having both of these as equilibria is inconsistent with pure altruism. Suppose that player l's concern for player 2 were independent of player 2's behavior. 1iGPS prove the existence of an equilibrium in all psychological games meeting certain continuity and convexity conditions. The kindness function used in the text does not yield utility functions that are everywhere continuous, so that GPS's theorem does not apply (although I have found no counterexamples to existence). As I discuss in Appendix A, continuous kindness functions that are very similar to the one used in the text, and for which all general results hold, can readily be constructed. Such kindness functions would guarantee existence using the GPS theorem. 12For X < 1, (boxing, opera) is also an equilibrium. In this equilibrium, both players are with common knowledge "conceding," and both players feel hostile toward each other because both are giving up their best possible payoff in order to hurt the other player. The fact that, for X < 1, (opera, boxing) is an equilibrium, but (boxing, opera) is not, might suggest that (opera, boxing) is "more likely." Then if he thought that player 2 was playing cooperate, he would play cooperate if and only if he were willing to give up 2X in order to help player 2 by 4X; if player 1 thought that player 2 was playing defect, then he would play cooperate if and only if he were willing to give up X in order to help player 2 by 5X. Clearly, then, if player 1 plays cooperate in response to cooperate, he would play cooperate in response to defect. In order to get the two equilibria, player 1 must care differentially about helping (or hurting) player 2 as a function of player 2's behavior. 13 The second issue that the prisoner's dilemma illustrates is the role of intentionality in attitudes about fairness. Psychological evidence indicates that people determine the fairness of others according to their motives, not solely according to actions taken.14 In game-theoretic terms, "motives" can be inferred from a player's choice of strategy from among those choices he has, so what strategy a player could have chosen (but did not) can be as important as what strategy he actually chooses. For example, people differentiate between those who take a generous action by choice and those who are forced to do so. Consider Example 3, depicted in Figure 3 . This is the "prisoner's dilemma" in which player 2 is forced to cooperate. It corresponds, for instance, to a case in which someone is forced to contribute to a public good. In this degenerate game, player 1 will always defect, so the unique fairness equilibrium is (defect, cooperate). This contrasts to the possibility of the (cooperate, cooperate) equilibrium in the prisoner's dilemma. The difference is that now player 1 will feel no positive regard for player 2's "decision" to cooperate, because player 2 is not volun- While I will stick to the conventional name for this game, I note that it is extremely speciesist-there is little evidence that chickens are less brave than humans and other animals.
Consider the Nash equilibrium (dare, chicken), where player 1 "dares" and player 2 "chickens out." Is it a fairness equilibrium? In this outcome, it is common knowledge that player 1 is hurting player 2 to help himself. If X is small enough, player 2 would therefore deviate by playing dare, thus hurting both player 1 and himself. Thus, for small X, (dare, chicken) is not a fairness equilibrium; nor, obviously, is (chicken, dare). Both Nash equilibria are, for small enough X, inconsistent with fairness.
Whereas fairness does not rule out Nash equilibrium in Examples 1 and 2, it does so in Example 4. The next section presents several propositions about fairness equilibrium, including one pertaining to why fairness rules out Nash equilibria in Chicken, but not in Prisoner's Dilemma or Battle of the Sexes.
III. Some General Propositions
In the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of Battle of the Sexes, each taking the other player's strategy as given, each player is maximizing the other player's payoff by maximizing his own payoffs. Thus, each player can satisfy his own material interests without violating his sense of fairness. In the Nash equilibrium of Prisoner's Dilemma, each player is minimizing the other player's payoff by maximizing his own. Thus, bad will is generated, and "fairness" means that each player will try to hurt the other. Once again, players simultaneously satisfy their own material interests and their notions of fairness.
These two types of outcomes-where players mutually maximize each other's material payoffs, and where they mutually minimize each other's material payoffs-will play an important role in many of the results of this paper, so I define them formally:
Definition 4: A strategy pair (a1, a2) E (S1 S2) is a mutual-max outcome if, for i= 1,2, jii, aieargmaxaE Si7j(a, a). Using these definitions, I state a proposition about two types of Nash equilibria that will necessarily also be fairness equilibria (all proofs are in Appendix B).
PROPOSITION 1: Suppose that (a1, a2) is a Nash equilibrium, and either a mutual-max outcome or a mutual-min outcome. Then (a1, a2) is a fairness equilibrium.
Note that the pure-strategy Nash equilibria in Chicken do not satisfy either premise of Proposition 1. In each, one player is maximizing the other's payoff, while the other is minimizing the first's payoff. If X is small enough, so that emotions dominate material payoffs, then the player who is being hurt will choose to hurt the other player, even when this action is self-destructive, and will play dare rather than chicken.
While Proposition 1 characterizes Nash equilibria that are necessarily fairness equilibria, Proposition 2 characterizes which outcomes-Nash or non-Nash-can possibly be fairness equilibria. PROPOSITION 2: Every fairness equilibrium outcome is either strictly positive or weakly negative. Proposition 2 shows that there will always be a certain symmetry of attitude in any fairness equilibrium. It will never be the case that, in equilibrium, one person is kind while the other is unkind.
While Propositions 1 and 2 pertain to all games, irrespective of the scale of material payoffs, I present in the remainder of this section several results that hold when material payoffs are either arbitrarily large or arbitrarily small. To do so, I will consider classes of games that differ only in the scale of the material payoffs. Given the set of strategies S1 X S2 and the payoff functions (-1(a1, a2), n-2(a1, a2) ), let W be the set of games with strategies Si X S2 and, for all X > 0, material payoffs (X 71(al, a2), X n72(al, a2)).
Let G(X)e -' be the game corresponding to a given value of X. Consider Chicken again. It can be verified that, if X is small enough, then both (dare, dare) and (chicken, chicken) are fairness equilibria. Note that, while these two outcomes are (respectively) mutual-min and mutual-max outcomes, they are not Nash equilibria. Yet, when X is small, the fact that they are not equilibria in the "material" game is unimportant, because fairness considerations will start to dominate. Proposition 3 shows that the class of "strict" mutual-max and mutual-min outcomes are fairness equilibria for X small enough.
PROPOSITION
3: For any outcome (a1, a2) that is either a strictly positive mutual-max outcome or a strictly negative mutual-min outcome, there exists an X such that, for all X E (0, X), (a1, a2) is a fairness equilibrium in G(X).
While Proposition 3 gives sufficient conditions for outcomes to be fairness equilibria when material payoffs are small, Proposition 4 gives conditions for which outcomes will not be fairness equilibria when material payoffs are small. PROPOSITION 4: Suppose that (a1, a2)e (S1,S2) is not a mutual-max income, nor a mutual-min outcome, nor a Nash equilibrium in which either player is unable to lower the payoffs of the other player. Then there exists an X such that, for all X E (0, X), (al, a2) is not a fairness equilibrium in G(X).
Together, Propositions 3 and 4 state that, for games with very small material payoffs, finding the fairness equilibria consists approximately of finding the Nash equilibria in each of the following two hypothetical games: (i) the game in which each player tries to maximize the other player's material payoffs and (ii) the game in which each player tries to minimize the other player's material payoffs.
There are two caveats to this being a general characterization of the set of fairness equilibria in low-payoff games. First, Proposition 3 does not necessarily hold for mutual-max or mutual-min outcomes in which players are giving each other the equitable payoffs (i.e., when the outcomes are neutral). Thus, "non-strict" mutual-max and mutual-min outcomes need to be doublechecked. Second, it is also necessary to check whether certain types of Nash equilibria in the original game are also fairness equilibria, even though they are neither mutual-max nor mutual-min outcomes. The potentially problematic Nash equilibria are those in which one of the players has no options that will lower the other's material payoffs.
I now turn to the case in which material payoffs are very large. Proposition 5 states essentially that as material payoffs become large, the players' behavior is dominated by material self-interest. In particular, players will play only Nash equilibria if the scale of payoffs is large enough. PROPOSITION 5: If (al, a2) is a strict Nash equilibrium for games in W, then there exists an X such that, for all X > X, (al, a2) is a fairness equilibrium in G(X).17 If (al, a2) is not a Nash equilibrium for games in W, then there exists an Xsuch that, for all X> X, (al, a2) is not a fairness equilibrium in G(X).
The only caveat to the set of Nash equilibria being equivalent to the set of fairness equilibria when payoffs are large is that 17 17A Nash equilibrium is strict if each player is choosing his unique optimal strategy. Mixed-strategy Nash equilibria are, for instance, never strict, because they involve the players being indifferent among two or more actions. some non-strict Nash equilibria are not fairness equilibria. Though this is formally an infinite-strategy game, it can be analyzed using my model of fairness.18 Applying Nash equilibrium allows any outcome. We might, however, further narrow our prediction, because the strategy r = v for the consumer weakly dominates all other strategies (this would also be the result of subgame perfection if this were a sequential game, with the monopolist setting the price first). Thus, if players cared only about material payoffs, a reasonable outcome in this game is the equilibrium where p = r = v, so that the monopolist extracts all the surplus from trade.
IV. Two Applications
What is the highest price consistent with a fairness equilibrium at which this product could be sold? First, what is the function fc(r, p), how fair the consumer is being to the monopolist? Given that the monopolist sets p, the only question is whether the monopolist gets profits p -c or profits 0. If r 2 p, then the consumer is maximizing both the monopolist's and his own payoffs, so fc(r, p) = 0. If r < p, then the consumer is minimizing the monopolist's payoffs, so fc(r, p) = -1. One implication of this is that the monopolist will always exploit its position, because it will never feel positively toward the consumer; thus, r > p cannot be a fairness equilibrium. Calculations show that the highest price consistent with fairness equilibrium is given 18Note, however, that I have artificially limited the strategy spaces of the players, requiring them to make only mutually beneficial offers; there are problems with the definitions of this paper if the payoff space of a game is unbounded. Moreover, though I believe that all results would be qualitatively similar with more realistic models, the exact answers provided here are sensitive to the specification of the strategy space. . (1986a, b) : a monopolist interested in maximizing profits ought not to set price at "the monopoly price," because it should take consumers' attitudes toward fairness as a given. I can further consider some limit results as the stakes become large in this game. Let the monopolist's costs and the consumer's value be C cX and V uX, respectively. I represent the percentage of surplus that the monopolist is able to extract by (z*-C)-(V -C). Algebra shows that this equals [2(V -C)/[1 + 2(V -C)], and the limit of this as X becomes arbitrarily large is 1. That is, the monopolist is able to extract "practically all" of the surplus, because rejecting an offer for the sake of fairness is more costly for the consumer.
Another interesting implication of the model is that dz*/dc > 0 for all parameter values. This means that the higher are the monopolist's costs, the higher the price the consumer will be willing to pay (assuming that the consumer knows the firm's costs). This is one interpretation of the results presented in Thaler (1985) : consumers are willing to pay more for the same product from a high-cost firm than from a low-cost firm.
An area of economics where fairness has been widely discussed (more so than in monopoly pricing) is labor economics.19 I now present an extended example that resembles the "gift-exchange" view of the employment relationship discussed in Akerlof (1982) For all such combinations of R and y, therefore, there exists a "gift-giving" equilibrium in which the worker sets e = H, and the firm gives the worker a bonus of b* = R /(1 + 4R). Note that the larger is y, the smaller R must be for there to exist a giftgiving equilibrium. The rpason for this is roughly as follows. If y is large, the worker is very tempted to "cheat" the firm by not working hard. The only way he will not cheat is if the firm is being very kind. But the firm's material costs to yielding a given percentage of profits to the worker increases as R increases; thus, only if R is very small will the firm give the worker a generous enough share of profits to induce the worker to be kind. In fact, if y 2 2, then there is no giftgiving equilibrium, no matter how small is R. This is because the firm's material incentives are such that it will choose to be unkind to the worker, so that the worker will choose to be unkind to the firm. Thus, overall the model says that workers and firms will cooperate if neither is too tempted by material concerns to cheat.
V. Fairness and Welfare
I consider now some welfare implications of fairness.22 My perspective here is that the full utility functions (combining material payoffs and "fairness payoffs") are the utility functions with which to determine social welfare. As such, I believe one should care not solely about how concerns for fairness support or interfere with material efficiency, but also about how these concerns affect people's overall welfare. other does not, then the grabber gets both cans. This is a constant-sum version of the prisoner's dilemma: each player has a dominant strategy, and the unique Nash equilibrium is (grab, grab). As in the prisoner's dilemma, the noncooperative (grab, grab) outcome is a fairness equilibrium, no matter the value of X. For small X, however, the positive, mutual-max outcome (share, share) is also a fairness equilibrium. Moreover, because these two fairness equilibria yield the same material payoffs, (share, share) always Pareto-dominates (grab, grab).
Consider
Shopping for minor items is a situation in which people definitely care about material payoffs, and this concern drives the nature of the interaction; but they probably do not care a great deal about individual items. If two people fight over a couple of cans of goods, the social grief and bad tempers are likely to be of greater importance to the people than whether they get the cans. Indeed, while both (grab, grab) and (share, share) are fairness equilibria when material payoffs are arbitrarily small, the overall utility in each equilibrium is bounded away from zero.23 As the material payoffs involved become arbitrarily small, equilibrium utility levels do not necessarily become arbitrarily small. This is realistic: no matter how minor the material implications, people's wellbeing is affected by the friendly or unfriendly behavior of others.
In Example 5, as with many examples in this paper, there is both a strictly positive and a strictly negative fairness equilibrium. Are there games that contain only positive or only negative fairness equilibria? If there are, this could be interpreted as saying that there are some economic situations that endogenously determine the friendliness or hostility of the people involved. More generally, one could consider the question of which types of economic structures are likely to generate which types of emotions.
The prisoner's dilemma illustrates that there do exist situations that endogenously generate hostility. Applying Proposition 5, the only fairness equilibrium of the prisoner's dilemma with very large material payoffs is the Nash equilibrium, where both players defect. This fairness equilibrium is strictly negative. Interpreting a negative fairness equilibrium as a situation in which parties become hostile to each other, this implies that if mutual cooperation is beneficial, but each person has an irresistible incentive to cheat when others are cooperating, then people will leave the situation feeling hostile.
Are there opposite, happier situations, in which the strategic logic of a situation dictates that people will depart on good terms? In other words, are there games for which all fairness equilibria yield strictly positive outcomes? Proposition 6 shows that the answer is no.24 PROPOSITION 6: In every game, there exists a weakly negative fairness equilibrium.
Proposition 6 states that it is never guaranteed that people will part with positive feelings. It implies a strong asymmetry in my model of fairness: there is a bias toward negative feelings. What causes this asymmetry? Recall that if a player is maximizing his own material payoffs, then he is being either mean or neutral to the other player, because being "nice" inherently involves sacrificing material well-being. Thus, while there are situations in which material self-interest tempts a player to be mean even if other players are being kind, material self-interest will never tempt a player to be kind when other players are being mean, because the 23In particular, the utility from (share, share) is positive for each player, and the utility from (grab, grab) is negative for each player: (share, share) Pareto-dominates (grab, grab). This again highlights the fact that social concerns take over when material pavoffs are small. Extending the model to more general situations will create issues that do not arise in the simple two-person, normal-form, complete-information games discussed in this paper. The central distinction between two-person games and multiperson games is likely to be how a person behaves when he is hostile to some players but friendly toward others. The implications are clear if he is able to choose whom to help and whom to hurt; it is more problematic if he must choose either to help everybody or to hurt everybody, such as when choosing the contribution level to a public good. Does one contribute to reward those who have contributed or not contribute to punish those who have not contributed.
Extending the model to incomplete-information games is essential for applied research, but doing so will lead to important new issues. Because the theory depends so heavily on the motives of other players, and because interpreting other players' motives depends on beliefs about their payoffs and information, incomplete information is likely to have a dramatic effect on decision-making. Extending the model to sequential games is also essential for applied research. In conventional game theory, observing past behavior can provide information; in psychological games, it can conceivably change the motivations of the players. An important issue arises: can players "force" emotions; that is, can a first-mover do something that will compel a second player to regard him positively? One might imagine, for instance, that an analogue to Proposition 6 Finally, future research can also focus on modeling additional emotions. In Example 6, for instance, my model predicts no cooperation, whereas it seems plausible that cooperation would take place (see Fig. 6 ). 25 This game represents the following situation. Players 1 and 2 are partners on a project that has thus far yielded total profits of 1OX. Player 1 must now withdraw from the project. If player 1 dissolves the partnership, the contract dictates that the players split the profits fifty-fifty. But total profits would be higher if player 1 leaves his resources in the project. To do so, however, he must forgo his contractual rights and trust player 2 to share the profits after the project is completed. So, player 1 must decide whether to "dissolve" or to "trust"; if he trusts player 2, then player 2 can either "grab" or "share."
What will happen? According to the notion of fairness in this paper, the only (pure-strategy) equilibrium is for player 1 to split the profits now, yielding an inefficient solution. The desirable outcome (trust, share) is not possible because player 2 will deviate. The reason is that he attributes no positive motive to player 1-while it is true that player 1 trusted player 2, he did so simply to increase his own expected material payoff. No kindness was involved.
One might think that (trust, share) is a reasonable outcome. This would be the outcome, for instance, if it is assumed that 25 A related example was first suggested to me by Jim Fearon (pers. comm.). players wish to be kind to those who trust them. If player 1 plays "trust" rather than "split," he is showing he trusts player 2. If player 2 feels kindly toward player 1 as a result of this trust, then he might not grab all the profits. If it is concluded that the idea that people are motivated to reward trust is psychologically sound, then it could be incorporated into formal models. While the precise kindness function used is not important to the qualitative results of this paper, the way I specify the overall utility function is perhaps more restrictive. One aspect that clearly determines some of the results in this paper is the fact that I completely exclude "pure altruism"; that is, I assume that unless player 2 is being kind to player 1, player 1 will have no desire to be kind to player 2. Psychological evidence suggests that, while people are substantially motivated by the type of "contingent altruism" I have incorporated into the model, pure altruism can also sometimes be important.
One natural way to expand the utility function to incorporate pure altruism would be as follows: In this utility function, if a > 0, then the player i will wish to be kind to player j even if player j is being "neutral" to player i. The relative importance of pure versus contingent altruism is captured by the parameter a; if a is small, then outcomes will be much as in the model of this paper; if a is close to 1, then pure altruism will dominate behavior.
As discussed above with regard to the kindness function, my model assumes that the fairness utility is completely independent of the scale of the material payoffs. Consider a situation in which a proposer's offer to split $1 evenly is rejected by a decider. My model says that the proposer will leave the situation unhappy not only because he has no money, but because he was badly treated. Yet my model implies that the proposer will be as unhappy, but no more so, when leaving a situation in which the decider rejected an offer to split $1 million evenly.
This seems unrealistic-the bitterness he feels should be larger the greater the harm done. The assumption could, however, be relaxed while maintaining all the general results of the paper. I could specify the utility function as: where G(X) is positive and increasing in X.26 26This specification and one of the conditions mentioned to maintain the limit results were suggested by Roland Benabou (pers. comm.). optimal for player 2 only if she has no choice of lowering player l's payoffs; otherwise, the fact that f1 < 0 would compel her to change strategies. This condition on player 2's choices directly contradicts the assumption that she could lower player l's payoffs. This establishes the proposition.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5:
If (a1, a2) is a strict Nash equilibrium, then the difference in material payoffs from playing the equilibrium strategy versus a nonequilibrium strategy becomes arbitrarily large as X becomes arbitrarily large. Because the fairness gains and losses are independent of X, ai eventually becomes a strict best reply to a1 as X becomes large.
If (a1, a2) is not a Nash equilibrium, then, for at least one player, the benefit in material payoffs from deviating from (a1, a2) becomes arbitrarily large as X becomes arbitrarily large. Because the fairness gains and losses are independent of X, ai is eventually dominated by some other strategy with respect to ai as X becomes large. When the kindness functions are continuous, GPS's general existence result means that this game has at least one equilibrium, (a*, a*). I will now argue that any such equilibrium is also a fairness equilibrium.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION
First, I show that, for i = 1, 2, fi(a*, a*) < 0. Suppose fi(a*,a*)> 0. Let a' be such that at E argmaxa sITi(a, a7 ). Then i(a ati j, a* ) > Vi ( a*, al*, a* ) which contradicts the premise. This is because the material payoff to i is higher with a' than with a*, and because fM(a, a*) < 0, so that the fairness payoff cannot be any lower than from a*.
Thus, for i-=1,2, fi(aa*,a*)<0; but this implies that, for each player, maximizing V(a , a*, a*) is the same as maximizing Ui(ai,aj,a*).
Thus, (a>,a ) is a fairness equilibrium.
